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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XV JUNE, 1930 No. 4
THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THE SHERMAN ACT
BY CHARLES NAGEL
From the day of its proposal the Sherman Act has been the
subject of more or less heated controversy. That much of the
discussion had little merit or was wide of the mark, goes without
saying. We were hardly broken to the demand for regulation
which has since possessed our country. We were still open
rebels as we have in a measure become secret defiers of unwel-
come laws. Above all, neither our captains of industry nor our
statesmen were generally prepared for the consideration of
measures so largely economic in their purpose and effect. After
the enactment of the statute, the question became one chiefly of
practical employment and interpretation. There were those
who affected to believe that it would prove to be no more than
many other legislative gestures--timely sops for public consump-
tion. There were others who contended that nothing short of a
repeal could save industry and commerce from utter disorgani-
zation and destruction. There were some who, admitting the
impossibility of repeal but insisting that the great promise of
our country's development must be fulfilled, took steps to adapt
and sometimes to evade the provisions of this new factor in our
problem. The struggle has been as protracted as it is fascinat-
ing. Large sums have been wasted; some enterprises have been
embarrassed, if not wrecked. Great lawyers have made dire
prophecies for extravagant fees; economic fallacies have been
promulgated; and indifferent statesmen have enjoyed sudden
popular acclaim. But withal there has come out of it-at dis-
proportionate loss of investment and time it is true-a rule of
reason and wisdom that now gives fair assurance and security
to all legitimate enterprise.
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It cannot be questioned, however, that of late the discussion
has received a new impetus. As is so often the case, the extreme
views hold the limelight. The advocates of absolute repeal are
as unrestrained in their denunciation as they are discriminating
in the selection of their audiences. Their utterances are direct-
ed mainly to immediate interested listeners-rarely rising to the
dignity of published articles. The impetuous advocates of uni-
versal regulation would not rest with the statute as it reads and
is interpreted, but would "give it teeth" by prescribing in in-
finite detail the conduct of industrial and commercial enter-
prise. Happily, however, the weary and costly analysis to which
the act has been subjected during these many years has not been
without profit. Those who are seriously concerned to reconcile
public welfare and individual success are not quick to surrender
this advantage. The clear conviction has resulted from the
conflict that wise regulation is an economic and a social neces-
sity and that reasonable private conduct provides the best pro-
tection against unreasonable public interference. Those who
hold this view are persuaded that between their own efforts to
adopt wholesome methods and the disposition of the courts to en-
force the reasonable intent of the statute an entirely tolerable
condition has been reached. Accordingly, they have as little
sympathy for the reactionary advocate of repeal as they have
for the heedless promoter of spasmodic amendments. They
have as little patience with those who would restore the chaotic
conditions of the past as they have with those who would mul-
tiply obscurities for future embarrassment. Their position
would appear to be strong. The only question is whether they
will rest content with the consciousness that they are right, or
whether they will enter the public arena as open defenders of
their position-true champions of the law.
With a view to provide the material for a liberal and thought-
ful consideration of the problem, the National Industrial Con-
ference Board has for some years pursued inquiries, and as a re-
sult has now issued four volumes which bear directly upon the
several phases of the question. These volumes will be of par-
ticular value to a large circle of readers who are interested in the
economic and legal problems of trade associations, mergers,
price agreements, etc.
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Needless to say, there is no attempt to furnish a safe rule of
conduct, or even to give an exhaustive or in any sense final
treatise of any of the subjects. But it is believed that all these
volumes will be of especial value to every one-business man and
lawyer-who is faced with the problems of modern economic
and social development and who is disposed to shape his course
with some advance understanding of their inherent significance
and trend. The great body of persons engaged in commerce and
industry are unquestionably trying to devise ways and means to
promote successful operation within rules and bounds that will
stand the test of time and public approval. Regulations and
restraints are the inevitable result of abuse of opportunity.
They are imposed for the protection of both the general public
and the particular dealer who seeks to live within the rule of
reason. What is or should be controlled or inhibited; how the
rules of economic success may advantageously be reconciled with
the safeguarding of public welfare; where the distinction is to be
drawn between a good trust and a bad combination, or between
an understanding about normal trade relations and improper
price agreements; how an exchange of trade inforfmation may
serve to advance business conditions in general, or may be used
to suppress wholesome competition; these are all questions dis-
cussed in these reports in a manner to facilitate ready grasp of
the fundamental principles that must be kept in mind. This
much is true. There will always be enough uncertainty in the
interpretation of any statute to render possible technical infrac-
tion of its provisions. But it is also possible for those who wish
to avoid such infraction to obtain information sufficiently clear
and definite to escape the charge of wrongful intention. To such
an understanding it is believed these volumes will provide a valu-
able contribution.
The foreword to the first of the National Industrial Confer-
ence Board's volumes, among other things, says:
It is obvious that the industrial and commercial develop-
ment of a nation is vitally influenced not only by the organi-
zation and methods of production and trade, in which the
initiative and enterprise of industrial and business leader-
' TRADE AssocIATIoNs: THEIR ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE AND LEGAL
STATUS (1925).
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ship are reflected, but by the environment of public atti-
tudes and governmental policies in which industry and com-
merce live and develop. Those two factors-individual en-
terprise and public control-are the two sides of the shield
of economic progress. They must be properly related and
proportioned; they must mutually sustain each other; and
they must develop together in accordance with the changing
needs of the times.
As the foreword says, the volume deals with the lesser forms
of organization and cooperation among separate business inter-
ests, of which the trade association is the type. It relates to the
question of the legitimate limits of cooperation among independ-
ent business enterprises in the form of voluntary associations
among trade competitors.
In the foreword to the second volume2 the following appears:
This volume . . . is an outcome of a comprehensive
investigation of the problems raised by governmental regu-
lation of industrial and business enterprise in the United
States. Such problems are ever-present in a society in
which manufacture and trade have undergone and are un-
dergoing such rapid development and change as is witnessed
in this country. Both this development of industry and
trade and some form of government policy toward them are
inevitable, and the flexible adjustment of the one to the
other is necessary for economic security and progress.
The third volumes gives an interesting account of the outcome
of different kinds of consolidations and amalgamations. Per-
haps the most illuminating result of the inquiry is the showing
that consolidation itself, regardless of size or financial power,
does not guarantee success. In other words, the advantage of
consolidation is proved to depend practically upon the economic
wisdom and reason of the plan which is employed.
In the preface of the fourth volume4 it is said:
Public policy in the regulation and control' of business
organizations and methods is a continuing factor in the
economic environment of modern life which must always be
reckoned with. Such policy establishes certain standards
of conduct for business in its relation to other business and
PUBLIC REGULATION OF COIiPETTIVE PRACTICES (1925).
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OP INDUSTRIAL CONSOLIDATIONS (1929).
' MERGERS AND THE LAW (1929).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss4/1
PURPOSE OF THE SHERMAN ACT
to the public. Like any general standards, for some they
mean restraint or compulsion, while for others they assure
a measure of freedom and individual initiative. The atten-
tion of the business community and the public at any time is
naturally most directed to the degree of compulsion or free-
dom which results from the prevailing public policy.
In the present volume the Conference Board carries its in-
quiry to the question of . . . corporate consolidation
or merger.
It is in this field that our anti-trust laws may be said to
have had their beginning, and although the character and
the extent of the merger movement in industry and trade
have greatly changed since the Sherman Act was adopted,
the status of the type of business organization under the
anti-trust laws remains a problem and presents many dif-
ficult questions both to business men and to public officials.
The primary purpose of this study is to trace the develop-
ment of public policy toward corporate consolidations and to
set forth, in broad outline, the modifications which this
policy has undergone in recent years, and its status at the
present time.
This last volume, Mergers and the Law, perhaps merits a more
extended reference. To many readers it will unquestionably
come as a surprise. Not only does it contain a thoughtful con-
sideration of the present advanced state of the law, but it gives
an account of the gradual development of all anti-trust legisla-
tion and its interpretation by the courts that must prove most
gratifying to both representatives of industry and the legal
profession.
The description of the growth and changes of commerce and
industry, the development of judicial interpretation, and the
common result of these two contributions, presents an account
which is, to say the least, illuminating. Again it must be said
that this little volume does not furnish a chart of safety. It
does, however, provide a compass to point the course with suf-
ficient certainty to avoid essential danger.
This general result dispassionately judged must arouse some
sense of surprise at the enormous cost and delay which were in-
volved in the achievement. Not without chagrin, but no doubt
with some measure of satisfaction, the substantial vindication of
the intention of the framers of the Sherman Act may now be ac-
cepted. Years of uncertainty and turmoil must be attributed
to the fallacy that the act was supposed to embody entirely new
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and largely experimental regulations. So loath are our people
to profit by the experience of others that little or no thought was
given to the historic origin and wisdom of the fundamental prin-
ciples of the Sherman Act. We protested and struggled, oblivi-
ous to the simple truth, in spite of the efforts of the original'
framers and champions of the act to set us right. The fact is
that the avowed purpose of the act was neither more nor less
than to adapt well recognized and tried principles to our institu-
tions. These principles were in no sense alien-borrowed from
some unrelated country-but were the outcome of the ripe ex-
perience of the people of Great Britain from whom the funda-
mental principles of our system of law had been derived. This
much was confirmed at the time by the most distinguished spon-
sors of the act.
Senator Hoar said:
We have affirmed the old doctrine of the common law in re-
gard to all interstate and international commercial trans-
actions.
Senator Sherman said:
It does not announce a new principle of law, but applies
old and well-recognized principles of the common law to the
complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal Govern-
ment. Similar contracts in any State in the Union are now
by common or statute law null and void.
That was the intention; and there was no one among those en-
gaged in this piece of legislation to challenge the correctness of
these statements.
It must be remembered, however, that simple as the principles
of the act appear to be, the conditions to which they were to be
applied were very far from simple. In Great Britain a single
authority had the power to speak for the entire nation. One
common rule governed in every situation. With us quite the
contrary was true. Ours is a dual system. Industrial and com-
mercial relations do not coincide with political boundaries. In-
tra-state and interstate commerce presented the objects of legis-
lative regulation. True, the Sherman Act concerned only the
latter; but the agitation of the subject and the varied legislative
policies adopted in more *than forty states necessarily added to
the confusion, reflected the popular conception of the Sherman
Act, and without question served to inspire a strained interpre-
tation. The Sherman Act was not the mere abstract conception
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of philosophic minds. It represented the practical effort of
highly trained statesmen to provide a reasonable curb to the con-
fessed industrial and commercial abuses of the day. Greed for
profit had run wild. Liberty had been turned into license; and
even meritorious enterprises under the pressure of false com-
petition had come to adopt methods that ran counter to accredit-
ed standards of conduct. True, the states were free to deal with
local conditions; but as commerce assumed more and more na-
tional proportions, the very inability of the states to cope with
this larger problem led them to enact more and more drastic
laws. By the time the Sherman Act was put upon the statute
book, the atmosphere was charged with a political agitation that
was little calculated to further a rational interpretation.
There is little wonder that the judicial pendulum swung from
one extreme to the other. Political candidates, eager for pro-
motion, vied with each other in the extravagance of promised
relief. Prosecuting officers gloried in the chance to lay a foun-
dation for future careers. Even courts groped for the con-
struction of statutes that might satisfy popular impatience. An
era for regulation of conduct by governmental force was inaugu-
rated, which in some phases has extended into the present time.
All these manifestations were present chiefly in the jurisdiction
of the states, and resulted in a conflict of theories, as well as
practices, that was nothing short of chaotic. There were no
leaders out of the wilderness. There was an abundance of ad-
vocates to profit by litigation. There was a dearth of counselors
to warn against hazardous enterprise, or to point the way out
of desperate commitments. The wise counsel of Senators Hoar
and Sherman was unheeded or forgotten. Even the Sherman
Act-rational, restrained, brief and terse as it was-could not
escape the consequences of such popular agitation. Decisions of
the lower Federal courts, representing many districts or circuits,
were not in accord. They ranged all the way from conservative
conclusions reached by reluctant judges, to extravagant edicts
uttered by judges who were eager to employ "the teeth" of a new
statute. The Supreme Court itself rendered decisions that at
one time seemed to be inspired by a desire to restrict the opera-
tion of a dangerous act, and at another time applied the act with
a freedom that suggested a purpose to demonstrate its futility
and absurdity. Throughout, every step from the institution of
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a public suit to the announcement of the final decree was had to
the refrain of political thunder in speech and platform and mes-
sage. Throughout, ill-advised or rebellious promoters of enter-
prise were providing new material in the form of evasive meas-
ures or pretended conformity to law, for ambitious demagogues
to feed upon.
Unwilling to be judged by the experience of others, we were
paying the price for our own. Some installments may still be
due. But as is demonstrated in the volumes referred to, a fairly
normal condition has been reached. This in itself is a great
satisfaction. The chief cause for congratulation, however, is
the fact that this situation is the outcome of patient, thought-
ful-yes, patriotic-cooperation in the conduct of industry and
the attitude of the courts.
Better acquaintance with the development of commerce and
industry in other countries-particularly in Great Britain-
might have protected us from many a prejudice against the
Slherman Act. It was avowedly a restatement in the form of a
Federal statute of well recognized principles-the outgrowth of
centuries of experience of a great commercial nation. An ap-
proach with that understanding might have saved years of costly
and needless litigation. The failure to accept the spirit of that
statute, and the endless wrangle over its literal requirements
were natural and perhaps inevitable during a period when statu-
tory regulation of personal conduct had become the order of the
day. The more interesting is the fact that the first reaction
from the extremely literal conception of law in our time was had
with respect to this great statute, which by degrees has been re-
deemed to vindicate the wisdom of its framers. No less inter-
esting is the fact that this beneficent outcome has resulted from
the efforts of both industry and the courts. The first still insist-
ing upon the employment and development of rules of economy
that are calculated to meet the demands of ever changing and
growing conditions, has sought and found ways to reconcile them
with the restraints wisely imposed by statute. The courts, still
upholding and enforcing those restraints have, however, saved
the statute from needless and harmful technicalities, and have
thus revived the spirit of the law to guide and control wholesome
enterprise. In the exercise of time-honored judicial discretion,
the courts, by announcing the rule of reason, have given real pur-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss4/1
PURPOSE OF THE SHERMAN ACT 321
pose and life to a statute which was in danger of being obscured
and distorted by the addition of endless and sometimes harmful
amendments.
The question will be asked whether the Sherman Act may not
be perfected by amendment. Perhaps so. But is there not
much more immediate prospect to have it weakened by excep-
tions or distorted by uneconomic extravagances? The demand
for amendments, either to tone down or to accentuate, neces-
sarily invites two risks. It is almost sure to disturb the normal
interpretation which the courts have by degrees developed. It
is practically certain to encumber the statute with crude and ill-
advised provisions, and thus embark upon another period of
doubt and uncertainty. At best there would be no promise of a
balanced, consistent, thoroughly digested economic policy. Be-
fore encouragement is given to further modifications, two things
must be kept in mind. The Sherman Act is perhaps as good an
example of the actual purpose and limitation of law making as
our history of legislation can show. It accepted as a basis the
teachings of ripest economic and social experience. It contented
itself with the statement of general fundamental principles for
the encouragement of legitimate competition, and for the pro-
tection of the public against illegitimate combination. Finally,
it preserved in the courts the discretionary power to interpret
both freedom and restraint in the light of actual conditions pre-
sented in each particular situation. The act did not undertake
to anticipate or to dictate a decision in every specific case, but
left it to the courts to judge of the purpose and reason of every
transaction, and in doing so to formulate rational rules of con-
duct within the statute.
If it is proposed to gauge the prospect of further amendments,
there is no better method than to take careful measure of what
has already been done in that respect. Without entering upon a
consideration of the intrinsic merits of the numerous amend-
ments or modifications that have been made, one fact stands out
as a signal of warning. Every act that operates to modify or
amplify the original Sherman Act is marked by the evil of ver-
bosity. Practically without exception, they lack evidence of the
simplicity of language and the restrained statement of rules of
conduct that charactertize the thoughtful, balanced and poised
form in which the original Sherman Act is cast. They read like
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an effort to supply in volume what is lacking in substance. They
are, generally speaking, the creatures of political opportunism.
The bearing of many of these amendatory acts upon the Sher-
man law is so remote that it is not necessary to dwell upon them
at length. In this connection they are interesting, chiefly to
show the possibilities of spasmodic legislative ventures. No bet-
ter illustration can be given than the pretended and avowedly
futile attempt to exempt labor unions from the operation of the
Sherman Act. These provisions are found in different forms,
sometimes as part of appropriation bills, and always couched in
language obscure enough to serve the political candidate, with-
out affecting the question at issue. The Packers and Stockyards
Act, the Capper-Volstead Act and the Cooperative Marketing
Act all have reason and merit. But they are not governed by a
controlling policy in method and system. Sometimes a number
of secretaries are asked to act in conjunction. At other times
one secretary is put in authority. In every instance highly com-
plicated machinery is created, often with governmental power so
absolute that the mere starting of a proceeding is apt to spell
ruin before the victim has a chance at the proverbial fair hear-
ing without which he should not be condemned. All these acts
provide the right to ultimate appeal to the courts. But they
make no provision for a reference to the Department of Justice
or Commerce to determine whether there is any justification for
the institution of a protracted inquisitorial and practically de-
structive proceeding. The citizen charged is at the mercy of an
executive authority which prefers the charge, makes the inquiry,
and renders the decision. The important hearing is vouchsafed
after the mischief is done. It is perfectly true that these tre-
mendous powers have as a rule been used with moderation and
wisdom. But in considering the possibilities of future amend-
ments, the immediate question is, what powers have been per-
manently granted by the legislative body, and not with how much
restraint they may have been temporarily employed. It should
be added that all the above acts deal with particular classes
which confessedly constitute subjects for exception. They are
referred to merely to show how important it is to have govern-
mental policy defined and democratic guaranties observed, and
legislative acts cast in clear language and in consistent form.
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The Webb-Pomerene Act is a direct attempt to modify or per-
fect the Sherman Act. It is at least doubtful whether its pro-
fessed purpose was not amply covered by the terms of the Sher-
man Act. It is hardly conceivable that a combination of indus-
tries to engage in and promote export trade would be held to
jeopardize the development of domestic industry or tle interests
of our consuming public. On the other hand, this act restricts
combinations to associations that are engaged solely in export
trade; and it can hardly be doubted that in effect this act has
embarrassed rather than encouraged export trade.
No doubt the Clayton Act is the outstanding attempt to give
additional force to the Sherman Act. In what measure it has
really succeeded may be doubted. Broadly speaking, its purpose
would seem to be met by the denunciation of combinations under
the Sherman Act. The acquisition of one concern by another,
resulting in the substantial suppression of necessary competi-
tion, would undoubtedly fall within the condemnation of that act.
If such acquisition were had by the purchase of share stocks in-
stead of assets, the case would probably be aggravated, because
the chance for manipulation and abuse would be increased by the
stock control.
The Clayton Act, however, goes farther. It denounces the
acquisition of capital stock in a competing corporation where the
effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competi-
tion between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the
corporation making the acquisition. Manifestly, there is some
conflict between this provision and the interpretation by the
courts of the Sherman Act. By the terms of the Sherman Act
as construed, either assets or share stocks may be acquired, pro-
vided a safe margin of competition is left in the market. The
Clayton Act does not denounce the acquisition of assets, and
therefore makes no change in this respect. It does, however,
denounce the acquisition of share stocks, and in that event is not
content with substantial suppression of general competition but
accepts as the test the substantial lessening of competition
between the purchasing and the selling corporations. This
is not only a new ground for complaint, but it constitutes some
departure from the accepted interpretation of the original Sher-
man Act. It adds a ground for complaint, the unreasonable em-
barrassments of which the courts have, however, softened, first,
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by refusing to sustain the complaint where the acquisition of the
share stocks has been followed by an acquisition of the assets be-
fore the Federal Trade Commission has entered a proceeding,
and second, by applying the reason of the rule to the term "sub-
stantial competition," thus bringing the original and the amen-
datory acts into substantial harmony. Other provisions of the
Clayton Act are numerous, and not always clear. Chief among
these is the creation of the Federal Trade Commission itself,
which is armed with absolute power to summon, to investigate,
to enter complaint, to take testimony, to hear argument, and to
enter judgment which is conclusive if there is any testimony to
sustain it. Again, the challenged citizen is left the consolation
of an appeal to the courts after he has been stigmatized as an of-
fender, or has perhaps suffered irreparable financial loss.
We have, therefore, an amendment in the Clayton Act which
provides a distinct and in some respects a conflicting ground for
complaint against combinations or purchases. We have also two
jurisdictions to deal with complaints--the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission. They may but do not al-
ways lap. They have established little or no system of coopera-
tion for the fair protection of bewildered citizens, and the fate
of the supposed offender will often depend upon which branch
of the Government strikes first. Criticism does not go to the use
which representatives of 'the Government have made of the
powers lodged in them. Indeed, the fact that there has been so
little arbitrary employment is one of the great causes for confi-
dence in our institutions. But the question today is what pros-
pect is there to have further legislative amendments fairly say
what we may wisely mean.
With entire frankness we must recognize that the proposed
anti-trust legislative schemes do not present an inspiring pic-
ture. They lack consistency and harmony and, above all, cen-
tralizing thought and purpose. Those who contemplate ready
amendments to soften or to enforce what we have, may well
pause to contemplate our experiences in that field. They should
first determine whether we are prepared for well considered
codification of existing statutes, for modification that will mould
them in a consistent, purposeful form, and whether we are will-
ing to take our chance with the outcome of inevitable, political
and partisan deliberation.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss4/1
